China

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GUEST OBSERVER
In March, China (including Hong Kong) passed New Zealand as Australia’s largest source of tourists. And that gap widened in April. Over the past year 1.35 million Chinese visited our shores. This is the new boom – the tourism boom – and again it is driven by China. 
Tourism Research Australia found that international visitors spent $36.6 billion in 2015 with China spending $8.3 billion or almost $8,000 per person. Spending was up by 18 per cent on a year earlier – the strongest growth in 14 years. And the latest data on tourist arrivals suggests that the spending by international visitors continues to lift, providing valuable momentum for the economy.
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 It has been a stellar week for the economy. Data has showed the economy growing at the fastest pace in 31⁄2 years; building approvals hit fresh record highs; car sales are at record highs; and tourist arrivals hit fresh record highs. The economy is firing on all cylinders. Clearly any suggestion that rate cuts are needed to lift a sagging economy is very much misplaced. The Reserve Bank cut rates in May – and still may cut rates again – on the premise that the economy can record even faster growth without sparking higher inflation.
What do the figures show?
Overseas arrivals &amp; departures
Tourist arrivals rose by 1.2 percent to record highs in April. Tourist departures fell 3.4 percent in April from record highs. Arrivals are up 11.6 percent on the year with departures up 2.2 percent.  
Tourists from greater China (China and Hong Kong) totalled 119,800 in April (mainland China 100,900, Hong Kong, 18,900), ahead of New Zealand (110,300).  
Tourist arrivals from mainland China and Hong Kong rose to a record 1,350,000 over the past year (up 21.6 per cent over the year) ahead of tourists from New Zealand (1,313,400 visitors over the past year).  
Over the past year, net permanent and long-term arrivals to Australia totalled 270,230 – the lowest level in nine years (May 2007).  
Over the year to April, 33,500 Aussies visited Pakistan, up 33.5 per cent on the 25,200 visitors in the year to April 2015. Also 329,000 Aussies visited Japan over the past year, up 26.6 per cent over the year.  
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New Car Sales
According to the Federal Chamber of Automotive Industries there were 96,672 new cars sold in May. Over the year to May a record 1,172,402 new cars were sold. Annual growth of 4.3 percent is the strongest in 31 months.  
In May alone, passenger car sales fell by 5.8 per cent on a year ago to 38,222; sports utility vehicles (SUV) sales rose 11.4 per cent to 36,230; light truck sales rose 10.6 per cent to 19,373 and heavy truck sales rose 5.9 per cent to 2,847.    
Sales across states in May 2016 on May 2015: NSW (+6.0 per cent); Victoria (+3.5 per cent), Queensland (+1.3 percent), South Australia (+9.6 percent), Western Australia (-5.0 percent), Tasmania (+4.3 percent), ACT (+8.9 percent) and Northern Territory (+3.1 percent).  
Car affordability  
New vehicle sales are rising because car affordability stands at record highs. The CommSec car affordability measure shows that someone on the average wage has to work 23.8 weeks to buy a new Ford Falcon auto sedan. That is around 2 weeks fewer than two years ago. And five years ago, the same worker would have had to work an extra seven weeks to buy the same car.
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Performance of Services
The Performance of Services index rose by 1.8 points to 51.5 in May. A reading above 50 suggests expansion of the services sector.  
The Australian Industry Group noted: “Of the five activity sub-indexes in the Australian PSI®, sales (51.7 points) and stocks (51.2 points) lifted into positive territory in May while new orders (55.3 points) continued its expansion. Deliveries (49.1 points) and employment (49.1 points) were both stable to slightly negative.”  
Four of the nine services sub sectors were stable or expanded in May. What is the importance of the economic data?  
The Australian Bureau of Statistics releases data on overseas arrivals and departures each month – an indicator of the health of the tourism sector. The figures are also useful in understanding spending trends and tracking migrant numbers – an indicator with widespread implications for employment, housing and spending.  
The Federal Chamber of Automotive Industries releases estimates of car sales on the third business day of the month. The figures highlight the strength of consumer spending as well as conditions facing auto &amp; components companies.  
The Australian Industry Group compile the Performance of Services Index (PMI) each month. The Australian PSI is the Australian equivalent of the US ISM services gauge. The PSI is one of the timeliest economic indicators released in Australia. The PSI is useful not just in showing how the services sector is performing but in providing some sense about where it is heading. The key ‘forward looking’ components are orders and employment.  
What are the implications for interest rates and investors?
In 2015 an estimated 120 million Chinese travelled overseas. Australia’s share was just over a million tourists. So there is scope for significant growth but it will require more transport and accommodation capacity being put in place.  
Another month, another record high for the car industry. New vehicle sales hit new highs in the year to May and it is clear that a key reason for the strength is the fact that cars have never been more affordable.  
The Reserve Bank policymakers will find it harder to cut rates in coming months. That doesn’t mean that it’s impossible, rather the Reserve Bank will need to be more active explaining the change.
Craig James is the chief economist at <a href="https://www.comsec.com.au/default.aspx" target="_blank">CommSec</a>.
 
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Chinese tourism boom, record car sales: CommSec's Craig James

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GUEST OBSERVER 
In July, China tier-1 property prices saw a further moderation in the pace of annual price growth; in tier-2 and tier-3, growth (again) inched higher, remaining at a much lower level than tier-1.
For new housing, 51 cities reported price gains in the month of July, down from 55 in June and a peak of 65 in April. But that is still well up on the number of cities reporting monthly gains a year ago (30 in July 2015). 16 cities reported monthly price declines, although that is also better than July 2015’s 29 cities.
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The secondary market has not seen as strong an improvement over the past year, a net 51 cities reporting monthly gains in July versus 41 a year ago and a peak of 54 four months ago (in March). 12 cities are currently experiencing price declines, compared to 17 a year ago. 
Splitting the 70 cities into the three development tiers, tier-1 continues to experience a robust pace of price growth, an average of 27.0 percent/yr for new housing and 29.3 percent/yr for the secondary market. Versus April’s peaks of 31.5%yr and 36.1%yr, that is still best characterised as a modest deceleration. 
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Within this tier, a normalisation is continuing: 
Shenzhen new property price growth has slowed from 62.5 percent/yr in April to (a still very strong) 40.9 percent/yr; meanwhile, Shanghai price growth has plateaued circa 28 percent/yr, as has Beijing and Guangzhou (albeit nearer 20 percent/yr). 
Similar trends are apparent in the established or secondary markets: Shenzhen slowing from 60.6 percent/yr in March to 33.9 percent/yr currently, and Beijing from 37.3 percent/yr in April to 32.1 percent/yr; Shanghai and Guangzhou price growth has been broadly unchanged in recent months, respectively 30 percent/yr and 20 percent/yr.
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Moving on to the less developed and wealthy tier-2 cities, new and established housing saw annual price growth of 7.8 percent/yr and 6.7 percent/yr in July. Both markets still remain in an uptrend, albeit a very modest one. 
This is even more the case in tier-3, where new and secondary house prices have risen just 3.8 percent/yr and 2.4 percent/yr over the past year. 
Clearly activity is concentrated in the most established and wealthy markets, where there is likely to be a greater speculative element. The problem is that these are not the cities with the greatest growth potential. 
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Further on aggregate activity, we note finally that momentum in housing sales and starts has already turned down. 
The outlook for real estate investment in late-2016 and into 2017 is fragile and unlikely to provide a significant contribution to aggregate growth.
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<div class="section">Elliot Clarke is senior economist, Westpac and can be contacted <a href="https://www.westpac.com.au" target="_blank">here</a>.</div>
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China property update: Westpac's Elliot Clarke

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GUEST OBSERVER
Big Chinese companies have been on an overseas buying spree in recent years, spending more than US$1.6 trillion scooping up businesses, property and “trophy assets” like football clubs.
But a directive from the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party puts some of this investment in Australia at risk. The directive specifically restricts outbound investments in real estate, hotels, entertainment, and football clubs. 
One of the big reasons for the crackdown is how these investments are funded. China’s financial system is dominated by banks and bank loans are the major source of corporate funding. But this is also risky - if one of these projects fails it risks the entire banking system.
The changes won’t affect large Chinese holdings in the Australian agriculture and metals sector, or personal investments in Australian property. But there will be an impact on the Australian property market - Chinese developers bought 38% of all residential property development sites in Australia last year. 
As Chinese investment in the Australian property sector will now be curtailed, we should expect money to be diverted elsewhere - into sectors that are still looked on favourably by the Chinese government. Most notably resources, agriculture, and possibly new energy technologies.
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Chinese companies have also been active in the Australian hotel and entertainment industries - Fuwah Group recently purchased the Park Hyatt in Melbourne (among others), and Dalian Wanda bought the Hoyts cinema chain. 
Over the past few years, Chinese companies have splashed out on many prominent properties - China Investment Corporation bought several office buildings in Sydney and Brisbane, and Aqualand purchased waterfront property in Sydney. Dalian Wanda currently has billion dollar developments underway in Sydney and the Gold Coast.
The motivations for these large investments in Australia and elsewhere are mixed. Earning a profit and other commercial goals are undoubtedly behind some of the moves, but others are strategically important for China - such as investing in agricultural land. But we shouldn’t overlook that many of these investments are “trophy assets”, and are about bringing prestige to the companies themselves.
<h2>Why is China cracking down?</h2>
In China, according to People’s Bank of China’s data, bank lending constitutes the vast majority of total financing. Therefore, it is more than likely the bulk of these recent overseas purchases by Chinese companies is bankrolled by Chinese banks. This compares to countries like Australia, where bond markets and sharemarkets play a larger role in financing big projects and investments.
The reliance on bank loans adds risk to the financial system. Should these projects fail, or the Chinese companies be unable to repay their debts, it could destabilise the entire banking system. And as Chinese banks remain state-controlled entities, the state has effective power to direct bank lending.
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The Chinese government’s directive doesn’t just restrict investment in real estate, hotels, entertainment and football. It also encourages investment in other areas - new energy, technology, resources and agriculture. The stated purpose is to ensure that investment aligns with China’s national interest and to set up procedures for monitoring and supervision of the investments.
The Chinese banking regulator, the China Banking Regulatory Commission has also started investigating five huge conglomerates - Anbang, Dalian Wanda, HNA, Fosun, and Zhejiang Rossoneri Investment which have been very active overseas. The Chinese banking regulator has askedmajor banks to provide details of the borrowing position of these companies and the risk associated with their loans.
On paper, all five conglomerates are apparently predominantly privately owned, with the possible exception of Zhejiang Rossoner Investment which was only incorporated in June 2016. Although directly or indirectly, the Chinese government will have some stake and it is hard to trace the ownership structure of large Chinese companies. 
<h2>What comes next?</h2>
There will definitely be an impact as Chinese investment dollars move away from property and prohibited other sectors. This investment currently constitutes a large proportion of Australian property development.
However, it also remains to be seen how else the Chinese government will try to achieve the “national interest”. Whether through regulatory control or through its direct control of the Chinese banking system, the Chinese government might try to influence or direct the operations of the overseas assets of these conglomerates. 
The Australian government has previously shown nervousness about enterprises in areas of national “strategic” importance, passing into the hands of Chinese businesses with connections to the Chinese government, with some acquisitions being blocked by the Foreign Investment Review Board. Increased Chinese interest is only likely to provoke increased Australian apprehension.
<a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/he-weiping-163918" target="_blank">He Weiping</a> is lecturer in Law, Monash University and author for <a href="https://theconversation.com/au" target="_blank">The Conversation</a>.
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Why China is cracking down on overseas investment

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China’s policy makers met at the National People’s Congress in early March, announcing an economic growth target range of 6.5-7 percent. 
In addition, they released a target growth rate for total social financing of ‘around 13 percent’ – which would result in a further deterioration of debt-to-GDP.
As noted in this month’s China Economic Update, a broader estimate of China’s debt puts this figure at around 308% of GDP – a level comparable to many advanced economies and particularly high for a still developing country. Chinese authorities are now facing a debt dilemma – they can no longer allow debt to grow unchecked, however controlling debt growth would mean accepting a slower rate of economic growth. At least for 2016, they appear content to allow the former to happen.
Industrial production growth slowed to a seven year low in January-February, while fixed asset investment accelerated slightly, on the back of stronger investment in real estate. New construction starts were stronger over this period, but it is too early to know if this is a trend that can be sustained.
Retail sales were a little softer – with real retail sales growth likely dipping below 10 percent yoy, slightly weaker than the levels recorded across most of 2015 but still robust. 
At the end of February, the People’s Bank of China (PBoC) cut the Required Reserve Ratio for the fifth time in a year – down to 17 percent for large institutions – potentially adding RMB 690 billion in liquidity to financial markets. As we have previously noted, these policy changes are not necessarily stimulatory, as RRR cuts have been necessary to maintain liquidity in the finance sector, given the capital outflow in recent years.
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China’s policy makers met at the National People’s Congress in early March, releasing a range of targets for key economic indicators. The most closely watched is the economic growth target, which was slightly reduced for 2016 – to a range of 6.5 percent to 7.0 percent – compared with last year’s ‘around 7.0 percent’. 
Our forecast for growth is unchanged at 6.7 percent in 2016 and 6.5 percent in 2017, although we consider the risks to be weighted to the downside. 
Authorities also set a target for growth in total social financing, at around 13 percent for 2016 – which would mean a further deterioration in the country’s debt-to-GDP ratio. 
As noted in this month’s China Economic Update, a broader estimate of China’s debt puts this figure at around 308 percent of GDP – a level comparable to many advanced economies and particularly high for a still developing country. 
Under the newly commenced 13th Five Year Plan, also released at the National People’s Congress, China is targeting an average rate of growth of 6.5 percent in the period to 2020 – which would result in a doubling of GDP over 2010 levels. 
Chinese policy makers are facing a significant dilemma regarding the country’s debt. They can no longer afford to allow debt to grow unchecked – as this would increase the likelihood of a major financial crisis and the potential for a hard landing. On the other side, real economic growth is unlikely to be sustainable at the five year target without stronger growth in debt – bringing down the ratio would mean tolerating a considerably lower potential rate for economic growth (something that policy makers are unlikely to tolerate). 
China’s industrial production slowed across January and February – down to 5.4 percent yoy (compared with 5.9 percent in December 2014). This rate of growth was below expectations and the slowest rate of growth since the same period in 2009. 
Key heavy industrial sectors remained weak – with crude steel output falling by 5.7 percent yoy, cement production down 8.2 percent yoy – reflecting weakness in the construction sector, while the motor vehicle sector recorded growth of 5.3 percent yoy. Electricity generation was marginally stronger – up 0.3 percent yoy. 
•China’s industrial surveys have remained negative in early 2016, with the official NBS survey falling to 49.0 points in February (from 49.4 points previously), the weakest level since January 2009. In contrast, the Caixin Markit PMI also fell, down to 48.0 points (from 48.4 in January), but this measure is less negative than late 2015. 
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Fixed asset investment recorded an acceleration in early 2016, with growth at 10.2 percent yoy across January and February, up from 8.2 percent yoy in December. It is worth noting that this was around the rate of growth recorded in November 2015, which was well below the trend levels of recent years. 
Investment in the manufacturing sector has continued to slow – reflecting tough industrial conditions and excess production capacity – down to 6.7 percent yoy (on a three month moving average basis), compared with 7.6 percent in December. In contrast, there has been a slight improvement in real estate investment, recording growth of 1.7 percent yoy (3mma) in February, up from -3.3 percent in December. Combined, these two sectors accounted for almost 56 percent of total investment in 2015. 
In contrast, strong investment growth has been sustained in water conservation and environmental management (27 percent yoy across January-February) and public utilities (19 percent yoy) – with these sectors comprising around 15 percent of the total in 2015. 
Residential construction activity was stronger in January-February, however it is too soon to know whether this is a trend that can be sustained. New construction starts were up around 9.7 percent yoy over this period, and up 1.5 percent yoy on our preferred three month moving average basis (reflecting very weak growth in late 2015). 
House price trends have improved in recent months, however the majority of gains have been in China’s tier 1 cities (Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen and Guangzhou) – where prices rose by 17% yoy. In contrast, tier 2 cities rose by just 0.3% yoy and tier 3 and below by 1.1% yoy. A more sustained recovery outside tier 1 cities may be required to support sustained stronger construction activity. 
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China’s trade activity pulled back sharply over the first two months of the year, with substantial falls in both imports and exports – both from the levels of late 2015 and from levels a year ago. China’s trade surplus only narrowed marginally – averaging US$47.9 billion a month across January and February (compared with US$59.4 billion in December 2015).
Across January and February, China’s imports totalled US$207.5 billion, a year on year fall of 17%. In part, this reflects the continued falls in commodity prices, with the RBA Index of Commodity Prices falling by almost 25% yoy in the first two months of the year.
In contrast, the volume of imports has declined less significantly, down by only around 2.8% in 2015, and around 6.8% in January (although the earlier timing of Chinese new year may have distorted the latter result).
In terms of major commodities, there were noticeable increases in imports of copper (up 23% yoy in January-February), crude oil (up 9.3% yoy) and iron ore (up 6.3% yoy). In contrast, the declining trend for coal continued, down by 10% yoy over the first two months.
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China’s exports totalled US$303.3 billion across January and February, a fall of 18% yoy. China’s exporters remain relatively negative, with the new export orders measure in the NBS PMI survey at 47.4 points in February (albeit improved from 46.9 points in January).
The key driver of the fall in export values over the first two months was a decline in exports to Asia – which fell by over 18 percent yoy, to US$90 billion. Exports to Europe and the United States fell less significantly – with both down by around 16 percent yoy.
Exports to Hong Kong declined less sharply than other markets – down by around 13 percent yoy across January and February. In contrast, non-Hong Kong Asia saw declines of almost 22 percent yoy – led by falling export values to Malaysia, South Korea and Vietnam.
Trade data between China and Hong Kong continues to have considerable distortions, in part due to false invoicing used to hide unapproved capital flows – providing considerable uncertainty around the true level of trade.
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At the end of February, the People’s Bank of China (PBoC) cut the Required Reserve Ratio for the fifth time in a year – down to 17 percent for large institutions – potentially adding RMB 690 billion in liquidity to financial markets. As we have previously noted, these policy changes are not necessarily stimulatory, as RRR cuts have been necessary to maintain liquidity in the finance sector, given the capital outflow in recent years. 
We continue to expect two cuts to interest rates in early 2016 – bringing the benchmark one year lending rate to 3.85 percent by mid-year. Similarly further cuts to the Required Reserve Ratio are likely to maintain liquidity in the finance sector, with capital outflows likely to continue in the short term. 
After a sharp increase in January (ahead of Chinese new year), new credit slowed significantly in February. Over the two month period, aggregate financing totalled RMB 4.2 trillion, an increase of 23 percent yoy. 
Bank loans recorded slightly slower growth, 19 percent yoy, to total RMB 3.1 trillion. Efforts to tightened regulation around the shadow banking sector has seen a strong increase in bank loans across the past two years. 
The key driver of other credit was corporate bonds, with net issuance totalling RMB 541 billion in January and February, an increase of 110 percent. 
Key components of the shadow banking sector largely cancelled each other out – with growth in trust and entrusted loans (at 111 percent yoy) offset by a sharp fall in banker acceptances (-275 percent yoy). 
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Alan Oster is group chief economist, National Australia Bank, and can be contacted <a href="https://business.nab.com.au/author/alan-oster/" target="_blank">here</a>.
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China's economy at a glance: NAB's Alan Oster

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GUEST OBSERVER
China’s next Five-Year Plan is due to be formally approved by the National People’s Congress in March 2016.
One of the areas of focus is the role of China’s State-Owned Enterprises, generally viewed with suspicion by the West and also seen within China as bloated and in need of a clean-up.
The Five-Year Plans have become a flexible political tool in the hands of central leaders seeking to shape the behaviour and priorities of diverse ministries and local governments.
China’s Cabinet recently released the latest document in what will be a cascading series of plans and guidelines feeding into China’s policy settings between now and 2020.
The State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) Guidelines are part of tackling China’s larger economic reform challenge. This requires shifting the overall macroeconomic growth model from domestic investment (mostly infrastructure) and a focus on exports, to one of growth led by domestic consumption and an expanded services sector.
The guidelines are the latest stage of an SOE reform process underway since the 1990s, as the Chinese state-controlled economy has made way for a rapidly growing private economy sector.
<h2>The current state of SOEs in China</h2>
The words typically used to describe the SOE sector in China are “inefficient”, “bloated”, and “bulky”.
The sector has been slimmed down a lot over the past decades, but still comprises 110 conglomerates. SOEs accounting for around 60% of total revenue are overseen by the central government’s State Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission. And between 25,000 – 150,000 SOEs (depending on which definition of <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-07-30/china-s-state-owned-companies-may-face-reform">“</a>state-ownership<a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-07-30/china-s-state-owned-companies-may-face-reform">”</a> is used) are controlled and managed by provincial, municipal and lower levels of government.
The larger SOEs maintain monopolies over key sectors of the economy (energy, mining, infrastructure) and smaller SOEs are characterised by low productivity and high debt levels. A lot of the problems and inefficiencies stem from the fact that the interests controlling SOE behaviour are not necessarily aligned with those of the wider economy or society.
<h2>Time for a clean out</h2>
Authorities have been consolidating and “cleaning up” SOEs for better resource allocation for a while now. China’s two major bullet train makers completed consolidation in the first half of 2015, while China Railway Corporation recently announced an asset-reorganisation with one of its subsidiaries.
Central authorities indicated earlier this year that Beijing would like mergers and acquisitions to result in a figure of around 40 conglomerates under the SASAC.
The real challenge will be in getting the Provinces to cooperate in cross-border mergers of provincial and municipal SOE assets. The ambitious Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei regional integration <a href="">blueprint</a> provides an important testing ground for getting different localities to cooperate, share and consolidate economic and social planning and resources.
<h2>Commercial vs ‘social’</h2>
Schools, universities, medical goods and service providers, and operators of public utilities (water, sanitation, energy, transport and communications) together form a huge and important part of the Chinese economy. It is important that they be run efficiently, but also important that they fulfil the social purposes for which they exist.
Providing equitable access to essential public goods and services means these firms cannot be expected to run on purely commercial considerations. And so the SOE guidelines indicate that SOEs will be categorised as either “commercial” or “public goods and services”, and dealt with accordingly. Commercial SOEs will be encouraged to become leaner, more efficient, and more market-oriented, while “social” SOEs will be encouraged to focus more on the quality of service provision.
<h2>Diversifying SOE ownership</h2>
A key part of making SOEs more efficient and more market-oriented is to allow private investors to purchase ownership stakes.
SOEs will be encouraged to bring in “various investors” through share-rights swaps, issuing new shares and/or convertible bonds and other means. Institutional investors in particular, including foreign ones, will be allowed/encouraged to buy stakes in SOEs, and SOEs will be allowed to experiment with employee share ownership schemes.
Oil and gas, electricity, railways and telecommunications have been identified as suitable for “limited” private investment: indeed, key energy companies Sinopec and National Petroleum Corp have already begun selling off parts of their operations.
While the Singapore Temasek model of state investment has been <a href="">cited</a>, strategic SOEs in China will never fit that model, but will remain under strict state (ie. Party) control.
Improved independent decision-making at board level will be encouraged by requiring the boards of all SOEs to have a majority of non-executive (external) directors. More professional managers will be employed, and a more flexible and market-based compensation system for SOE officers will link pay to company performance.
<h2>Obstacles to reform</h2>
The key obstacle to SOE reform will be overcoming “pushback” from entrenched interests at local, provincial and national government levels. Overcoming this obstacle is made particularly difficult because of the emphasis on leadership of, and control by, the Chinese Communist Party.
Reforming the Party, particularly to reduce corruption, is also an important part of the Five-Year Plan, but loosening the Party’s grip on control is nowhere in sight. The extent to which the politics of the 13th Five Year Plan remain compatible with its economic reform goals therefore remains to be seen.
Alice de Jonge is senior lecturer, International Law; Asian Business Law, Monash University and author for The Conversation. She can be contacted <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/alice-de-jonge-118840" target="_blank">here</a>.
 
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China’s grip still tight on state-owned enterprises

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If you pick up a newspaper these days, you had better have some Xanax handy. The headlines from China can be pretty scary.
But the truth is, the situation is more mixed than most fear-mongers would have you believe.
If you wear a miner's light on your hard hat when you go to work in the morning, then, sure, you have a right to worry that China's industrial economy could slow further.
But if you work or invest in real estate, or for that matter in the fields of education or tourism, you can rest easy.
You see, China has at least two different economies. The old industrial economy is slowing and being cleaned up. Even as the government moves to shut down polluting, outdated factories, consumer demand is booming, which means more buyers for Australian property, as well as for our tourism and education.
China doesn't rely solely on industry any more than Australia relies solely on mining. Industry only accounts for about 35% of GDP, but services account for more than half.
Credit Suisse sent me an interesting chart last week. It showed that China is importing about 20 percent less machinery and commodities like coal, but spending 80 percent more on international tourism. This is reflected in the fact that more than one million Chinese tourists came to spend their cash in Australia last year, the most ever.
Australia's educational sector is our number one export, after coal, iron ore and natural gas. Chinese outnumber all other foreign students in university, English-language, secondary and nonaward classes.
This is the same scenario we are seeing in real estate. With Chinese developers committed to billions of dollars of residential new construction in Australia, and Chinese buyers purchasing off-the-plan in large numbers, Australia finally has something it has been missing for decades: money to build.
Awe have spent years in a housing affordability crisis, but Chinese capital is finally making it possible to construct enough new homes to meet market demand.
In the past decade, China supported Australia's economy by funneling huge amounts of cash into our mining industry. In the coming decade, it looks like it will do so via real estate, education and tourism.
It's no coincidence that the famous Sydney Harbour Bridge Climb now offers a sky-high karaoke option for Chinese tourists.
Here's something that will make that shift sweeter: tourism, education and construction keep more than 2 million people working in this country, while mining just provides jobs for fewer than 200,000.
China's current expansion won't last forever, but experts like UBS global CEO Sergio Ermotti believe the rise of the Chinese consumer could last as long as did the commodities boom we just lived through.
Even at a pessimistic growth rate of 6.5 percent, China's economy will double in size by 2032.
Andrew Taylor is the founder and chief executive officer of sales and marketing at <a href="https://www.juwai.com/" target="_blank">Juwai.com</a>, the number-one Chinese real estate portal for property in Australia and around the world. Find out more about him <a href="https://list.juwai.com/" target="_blank">here</a>.
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The bad news from China is good for property: Juwai's Andrew Taylor

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GUEST OBSERVER
December saw a continuation of the recent trend of softer price growth in tier-1 cities and sustained price gains for tier-2 and 3. 
Of the 70 cities reporting, 46 responded that the price of new dwellings had increased in the month; similarly, 45 cities also saw monthly gains in the secondary market.
<a href="https://www.propertyobserver.com.au/images/2017/01/20/Screen%20Shot%202017-01-20%20at%208.17.08%20AM.png" target="_blank">Click to enlarge</a>
<img src="https://www.urban.com.au/images/2017/01/20/Screen%20Shot%202017-01-20%20at%208.17.08%20AM.png" alt="">
 
While down from their respective peaks of 65 (April 2016) and 60 (September 2016), price growth for new and existing dwellings clearly remains robust and broad based. There has been an increase in the number of cities reporting price declines for new builds, but these remain well below the level seen in 2015. 
Over the year, price growth in tier-1 cities remains strong despite having moderated since April. For new builds, prices are currently up 24.9 percent/yr. Price growth in the existing market is a little stronger at 28.8 percent/yr. 
<a href="https://www.propertyobserver.com.au/images/2017/01/20/Screen%20Shot%202017-01-20%20at%208.25.12%20AM.png" target="_blank">Click to enlarge</a>
<img src="https://www.urban.com.au/images/2017/01/20/Screen%20Shot%202017-01-20%20at%208.25.12%20AM.png" alt="">
As we have outlined on a number of occasions, much of the deceleration in annual price growth in tier-1 cities has come as a result of a material slowdown in Shenzhen, from 62.5 percent/yr in April to 23.5 percent/yr currently (for new homes). 
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In effect, Shenzhen has come back to the pack, with Beijing and Guangzhou seeing sustained annual growth circa 22 percent/yr over that time and Shanghai having slowed from 32.9 percent/yr (September 2016) to 26.4 percent/yr.
<a href="https://www.propertyobserver.com.au/images/2017/01/20/Screen%20Shot%202017-01-20%20at%208.26.23%20AM.png" target="_blank">Click to enlarge</a>
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Price growth in tier-2 and tier-3 cities was also very healthy in December, respectively at 12.0 percent/yr and 8.8 percent/yr for new builds. The outcomes for existing dwellings were similar albeit a little softer, at 9.6 percent/yr and 5.7 percent/yr. 
Authorities will be pleased that momentum has broadened outside of tier-1 in a sustained manner. Looking ahead, additional demand for domestic property is likely to build as a result of households being unable to (legally) invest abroad.
<a href="https://www.propertyobserver.com.au/images/2017/01/20/Screen%20Shot%202017-01-20%20at%208.27.57%20AM.png" target="_blank">Click to enlarge</a>
<img src="https://www.urban.com.au/images/2017/01/20/Screen%20Shot%202017-01-20%20at%208.27.57%20AM.png" alt="">
 
Currently the construction and investment data is only available to November. Till then it is apparent that the inventory of unsold homes and current construction projects continued to be worked through. However, we are yet to see new project starts respond. 
<a href="https://www.propertyobserver.com.au/images/2017/01/20/Screen%20Shot%202017-01-20%20at%208.29.23%20AM.png" target="_blank">Click to enlarge</a>
<img src="https://www.urban.com.au/images/2017/01/20/Screen%20Shot%202017-01-20%20at%208.29.23%20AM.png" alt="">
If confidence in the housing market and the broader economy is sustained, then a (likely modest) pick-up in starts is only a matter of time. 
Elliot Clarke is senior economist, Westpac and can be contacted <a href="https://www.westpac.com.au/" target="_blank">here</a>.
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New dwelling price increases for December in China

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<img src="https://counter.theconversation.edu.au/content/67155/count.gif?distributor=republish-lightbox-basic" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1">
GUEST OBSERVER
People from cultural backgrounds where getting financial assistance from families is the norm are less likely to default on their mortgages, new research shows.
This includes those from South East Asian countries.
We also found in societies where the culture is to save more and for people to control their desires and instincts, the default on mortgages is lower. The findings are true both in relatively stable economic periods (2010-2013) and during a period of financial crisis (2008-2009).
In analysing the factors behind mortgage delinquencies, we used data on default rates from 42 developed and developing countries. These countries represent about 90% of the world’s gross national income and the world’s outstanding balance of housing mortgages in 2013. The rate of people who defaulted on their mortgage varied from 0.05% in Hong Kong to 17.05% in Greece.
Australia has a low default rate on mortgage, thanks to a strong level of national income, stable growth of the property market and a low unemployment rate. But it ranks high in all cultural dimensions that potentially lead to high default rate, this is accentuated during times of widespread economic hardship. So policymakers should be mindful of unfavourable economic conditions that may trigger default on mortgages. 
There are a number of explanations for our findings. Individuals who have a tendency to enhance or protect their self esteem, by taking credit for success and denying responsibility for failure, may overestimate their abilities make enough money to meet their long term financial obligations. They also have relatively weaker self-monitoring skills and may not budget well. 
Also, in societies where people are expected to be independent and only take care of their own interests, the rate of default on mortgage is higher. A lack of access to support from extended families and groups may make it difficult to pay back their mortgages during the period of financial hardship.
We found that borrowers in countries exhibiting higher degrees of pragmatism (e.g. having a long-term view to life) are less likely to default on their mortgages. People in these countries have a higher tendency to save. These people are also probably less likely to undertake risky mortgages and therefore default less on their mortgages.
In societies with a strong emphasis on enjoying life there was a higher rate of defaults. These people are more likely to follow their impulses and desires and so might not allocate their financial resources efficiently. They may spend more money than they can afford on leisure activities and have less savings to service their mortgages.
Not surprisingly we found countries with higher levels of household disposable income, lower unemployment rates and higher growth in house prices, would have lower default rates on mortgage. However, national debt rules, regulations and chronic and prolonged illness, aren’t significantly associated with defaults on mortgages in our sample countries. 
Housing mortgages account for about 75% and 50% of total consumer lending in the developed and developing economies, respectively. Our findings are of particular importance for multinational financial institutions because they hold mortgage loans as a large portion of their assets and therefore higher default rates may significantly lower their market values. 
Our results show that lenders should take into account the cultural backgrounds of borrowers when determining how likely it is that they will default. This is in addition to common economic factors, such as income, unemployment, and house prices, socio-demographic factors like divorce and race and health characteristics of borrowers. 
For example, multinational financial institutions could promote their mortgage products more in societies where people receive support from their relatives or members of groups. They could also focus on countries where people have a higher propensity to save for the future and are less interested in leisure activities. This could save these institutions a lot in terms of risk, but would also be much better for their customers.
Reza Tajaddini is lecturer in Finance, Swinburne University of Technology and can be contacted <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/reza-tajaddini-308121" target="_blank">here</a>.
Hassan F. Gholipour is lecturer in Economics, Swinburne University of Technology and can be contacted <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/hassan-f-gholipour-309444" target="_blank">here</a>.
Both are authors for The Conversation.
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Asian home buyers less likely to default on their mortgage: study

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GUEST OBSERVER
The latest available China housing data reports that the pick up in house price momentum in August was sustained in September, across both new and existing markets.
For new housing, 63 cities reported price gains in the month, broadly in line with August’s 64 and the recent peak of 65 in April 2016. Emphasising the breadth of the improvement in 2016, a year ago only 37 cities reported price gains.
The secondary market improved further in September with 60 cities reporting price gains in the month. That contrasts to 57 in August 2016; 54 in March 2016; and 40 a year ago. Only 7 cities are currently experiencing price declines – the best result for this metric since end-2013.
<a href="/images/2016/10/24/Screen%20Shot%202016-10-24%20at%2012.24.07%20PM.png" target="_blank">Click to enlarge</a>
<img src="/images/2016/10/24/Screen%20Shot%202016-10-24%20at%2012.24.07%20PM.png" alt="">
Investigating annual price growth by tier, 2016’s key themes endured in September. Price growth of near 30 percent/yr continues to be seen on average in tier- 1 cities, across both new (29.4 percent/yr) and existing (33.0 percent/yr) markets.
Also, the tier-2 averages gained further momentum, from 9.1 percent/yr to 11.1 percent/yr for new and 7.6 percent/yr to 9.0 percent/yr for existing. Meanwhile, tier-3 price growth remains fickle, new and existing house prices up 6.6 percent/yr and 4.4 percent/yr respectively.
<a href="/images/2016/10/24/Screen%20Shot%202016-10-24%20at%2012.17.44%20PM.png" target="_blank">Click to enlarge</a>
<img src="/images/2016/10/24/Screen%20Shot%202016-10-24%20at%2012.17.44%20PM.png" alt="">
As we have previously highlighted, the most interesting aspect of the price data is not the tier averages, but rather the city-by-city detail.
Herein we continue to see strong evidence of speculative demand, with a wide spectrum of price activity by city.
In tier-1, against the 29 percent/yr average result for new housing: Shenzhen price growth has slowed from near 63%yr in April to 34 percent/yr currently; over the same period, price growth has accelerated from around 17 percent/yr to 27 percent/yr and 23 percent/yr respectively in Beijing and Guangzhou. Shanghai has been stable near 30 percent/yr.
In tier-2, against the 11 percent/yr average: Hefei and Nanjing are currently seeing price growth of 46 percent/yr and 40 percent/yr, while many other cities such as Dalian are broadly flat year on year.
Similarly in tier-3, against its 6.6 percent/yr average for new housing, annual price growth varies between 47 percent/yr in Xiamen to –4.5 percent/yr in Jinzhou.
Clearly, cities with close ties to tier-1 and/or new industry are attracting investors (and owner occupiers); but elsewhere, demand is lacking.
<a href="/images/2016/10/24/Screen%20Shot%202016-10-24%20at%2012.19.11%20PM.png" target="_blank">Click to enlarge</a>
<img src="/images/2016/10/24/Screen%20Shot%202016-10-24%20at%2012.19.11%20PM.png" alt="">
Given the disparate conditions across the nation, the divergence between sales and starts is likely to persist as significant inventory of unsold new homes lingers in many jurisdictions.
Indeed, even in areas where price growth has been strong, developers have cause to manage new supply carefully so as to see prices sustained at high levels. This is particularly true if authorities impose further restrictions in ‘overheated’ markets.
<a href="/images/2016/10/24/Screen%20Shot%202016-10-24%20at%2012.20.27%20PM.png" target="_blank">Click to enlarge</a>
<img src="/images/2016/10/24/Screen%20Shot%202016-10-24%20at%2012.20.27%20PM.png" alt="">
As a consequence, while it has improved through 2016, growth in real estate investment is likely to remain soft relative to history, providing only modest support to manufacturing and commodity prices.
<a href="/images/2016/10/24/Screen%20Shot%202016-10-24%20at%2012.21.44%20PM.png" target="_blank">Click to enlarge</a>
<img src="/images/2016/10/24/Screen%20Shot%202016-10-24%20at%2012.21.44%20PM.png" alt="">
As a final point, note that the strong price gains witnessed over the past year pose a risk to services activity into 2017. Chinese households remain willing to invest in property despite the higher cost, but doing so could crimp their ability and willingness to spend elsewhere. This is particularly true if job creation in the construction sector and related areas disappoints. 
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<img src="/images/2016/10/24/Screen%20Shot%202016-10-24%20at%2012.22.47%20PM.png" alt="">
 
Elliot Clarke is senior economist, Westpac and can be contacted <a href="https://www.westpac.com.au/" target="_blank">here</a>.
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Pick up in China housing data sustained: Westpac's Elliot Clarke

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Suspicion of Chinese corporations investing in Australia is not well justified when you consider the growth of private enterprise in China and the state of the Chinese Communist Party.
The fierce public debate about Chinese corporations investing in Australia is spurred by several misleading ideas about how much control the Chinese government has and its intervention with private businesses. 
The fact is, massive privatisation has been ongoing in China since the 1980s, involving millions of business enterprises. Currently around 70 percent of Chinese industrial output is now produced by non-state controlled business firms, and over 80 percent of the industrial workforce in China is now employed in the private sector. 
Private enterprises have been the growth engine of the Chinese economy, providing 95 percent of the growth of the urban workforce in the past three decades, and many now compete with state-owned conglomerates for brand recognition and size. Inevitably, private firms have started expanding overseas to find new markets and diversify their investments.
A common claim is that despite many Chinese investors being private corporations, they are still effectively controlled by the governmentthrough the Chinese Communist Party.
It’s true that if there are more than three party members within any organisation in China, those members have the right to set up a Communist Party branch. This includes employees of private corporations, and there are currently party branches within approximately 13 percent of private Chinese firms, a figure which rises to 53.1% among larger private firms. 
But this does not necessarily result in party control over those corporations’ business decisions. Li Zhangzhu, the Deputy Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party branch within Yuanfang Group, a large private firm based in Henan Province, declared:
"What the boss of a private enterprise cares about most is business results. The boss will only pay attention to and support [Chinese Communist Party] building if it helps to promote the growth of the business and increases profits."
Academic Bruce Dickson found that attempts to build the Communist Party’s presence in the private sector actually promoted private business interests rather than those of the party’s leadership. 
The Communist Party simply cannot afford to alienate private entrepreneurs because it relies on them to deliver continuing economic growth and provide employment. Without this the party would lose its legitimacy and power. 
A recent survey of several hundred private Chinese corporations by Fan Xia of Shandong University found that if there was a time conflict between an activity scheduled by the firm’s Communist Party branch and their regular work duties, 91.8% of CCP members in private firms would not participate in the party activity unless their CEO gave them permission. 
Another assumption is that the party and the central government control Chinese society with an iron fist). In fact, there is plenty of evidence of massive corruption and policy divisions that cast doubt on whether the party can even control itself. 
In the current anti-corruption campaign, more than 447,000 Communist Party officials have been investigated since 2012, with over 230,000 of these criminally prosecuted in the courts, ranging from the lowest level apparatchiks right up to politburo (policy-making) members, Supreme People’s Court justices and military generals.
Some senior Communist Party officials have been convicted for accepting bribes totalling tens of millions of dollars, according to Chineseand Western media sources.
Many of these bribes were paid in return for promotions within the Party hierarchy or government bodies. For instance, 45 representatives were expelled from the National People’s Congress in September 2016, after evidence emerged that they had used bribery to obtain their nominations; and 454 delegates (out of 612) were expelled from the Liaoning Provincial People’s Congress for similar reasons. 
Research suggests that the party has lost control over its own personnel system and cannot guarantee that its officials are competent or honest. It also explains why a government communique in 2016 referred to many “dangers” that may threaten the very existence of the party, “including the slacking of officials, incompetence, isolation from the people and corruption”.
Contrary to the popular misconception that China is a highly centralised state, few laws and policies are enforced in a uniform way throughout the country. 
For example, in Shenzhen, a Southern Chinese city with over 10 million people, half the buildings within the city have no legal titles and have been rented or sold to millions of people illegally. Relying on the illegal private housing market was the only way for the local government to provide sufficient housing for the millions of migrants arriving in Shenzhen from other parts of China over the past three decades.
This example of decentralised decision-making also counters another assumption about large-scale investment by private Chinese firms in Australia - that it’s part of a “unified” Chinese government strategy to undermine our national security. 
In fact, outward foreign investment from China has become increasingly decentralised, so that the vast majority of investments under US$1 billion are now approved at provincial or municipal government levels. There is also a lot of competition between different Chinese regions and provinces in seeking the economic benefits of investment overseas. 
There needs to be more acknowledgement of the complexity of the influences at play within Chinese corporations rather than just jumping to the conclusion that all are controlled by the Chinese government. Especially if these businesses are bringing economic benefits by investing in Australian businesses and infrastructure.
Colin Hawes is associate professor, University of Technology Sydney and author for The Conversation. He can be contacted <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/colin-hawes-111743" target="_blank">here</a>.
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