West Gate Tunnel

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GUEST OBSERVATION
Victoria’s government finds itself in a big hole with its West Gate Tunnel project.
As diggers lie idle in a dispute over what to do with contaminated soil, it’s facing long delays and billions in extra costs. But the government appears locked into a contentious project that was put to it as a market-led proposal, an arrangement that bedevils transport projects across Australia.
Australian governments look increasingly to <a href="http://www.projectmanagement.ie/blog/megaprojects-10-facts-you-should-know" target="_blank">mega-projects</a> to solve urban and regional transport problems. These projects are city-shaping. They can transform how entire urban regions function.
The public has a clear stake in these projects, but unsolicited market-led proposals are subverting planning processes that are meant to protect the public interest.
Market-led proposals are <a href="https://www.claytonutz.com/knowledge/2014/february/victoria-releases-new-unsolicited-proposal-guideline-for-projects-and-services" target="_blank">unsolicited bids</a> to government by private firms to provide public services or infrastructure. Policies governing market-led proposals were <a href="https://graduates.corrs.com.au/assets/thinking/downloads/whats-next-market-led-proposals-in-aus.pdf" target="_blank">introduced in 2014 and 2015</a> by state governments across Australia to promote innovation in service delivery and value for money for taxpayers.
The <a href="https://thelawreviews.co.uk/edition/the-public-private-partnership-law-review-edition-5/1189694/australia" target="_blank">increasing use</a> of <a href="https://www.dtf.vic.gov.au/infrastructure-investment/market-led-proposals" target="_blank">market-led proposals</a> for transport mega-projects raises important questions. How are policies governing these managed, to what end, and for whose benefit?
In Melbourne, the <a href="https://www.theage.com.au/politics/victoria/tunnel-trouble-dan-andrews-and-transurban-face-a-parting-of-the-ways-20200131-p53wjo" target="_blank">tensions</a> between toll road operator Transurban and the Victorian government over the West Gate Tunnel highlight a fundamental shortcoming of market-led proposals. Bluntly, these are not suited to the planning of transport mega-projects because governments can become “locked in” with <a href="https://theconversation.com/impending-traffic-chaos-beware-the-problematic-west-gate-tunnel-forecasts-79331" target="_blank">questionable benefits</a>. Lock-in has been <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1068/b36017" target="_blank">defined</a> as “the escalating commitment of decision-makers to an ineffective course of action”.
The case of the West Gate Tunnel
Transurban’s builders of the West Gate Tunnel, John Holland and CPB Contractors, <a href="https://www.theage.com.au/national/victoria/more-than-100-west-gate-tunnel-workers-set-to-be-laid-off-20200113-p53r1a" target="_blank">laid off 137 workers</a> last month in a dispute about liability for contaminated soil. This is bad press for the state government, which touted <a href="http://westgatetunnelproject.vic.gov.au/about/faqs/west-gate-tunnel/what-job-opportunities-are-there" target="_blank">job creation and training</a> as key project benefits.
The dispute could add to delays and costs on top of two earlier changes related to the project. The first was a ten-year extension to Transurban’s <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CityLink" target="_blank">CityLink tolling concession</a> that will cost road users <a href="https://www.propertyobserver.com.au/https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-03-19/cost-to-motorists-of-westgate-tunnel-deal-revealed/10915998" target="_blank">billions of dollars</a>. The second was an increase in construction costs from <a href="https://www.propertyobserver.com.au/https://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-12-12/melbournes-west-gate-tunnel-project-cost-blows-out/9248994" target="_blank">A$5.5 billion to A$6.7 billion</a> to extend tunnels to <a href="https://www.theage.com.au/national/victoria/western-distributor-longer-tunnel-chosen-for-second-river-crossing-project-20160709-gq24uf" target="_blank">save a public park</a>.
Explanations for the dispute include the Environmental Protection Authority <a href="https://www.theage.com.au/national/victoria/west-gate-tunnel-builders-threaten-to-tear-up-contract-over-soil-contamination-20200129-p53vo2" target="_blank">tightening soil disposal requirements</a>, <a href="https://www.theage.com.au/national/victoria/west-gate-tunnel-in-limbo-as-government-companies-argue-over-contaminated-soil-20200122-p53tnm" target="_blank">difficulties determining site conditions</a> during the environmental assessment process, and <a href="https://www.propertyobserver.com.au/https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-01-29/west-gate-tunnel-builders-seek-to-terminate-contract-over-pfas/11909402" target="_blank">insufficient foresight and planning for these risks</a>.
Another explanation for what happened is “lock-in”. Evidence of lock-in on the West Gate Tunnel points to deeper systemic problems with market-led proposals for transport mega-projects in general.
How does lock-in happen?
Lock-in can occur when powerful corporations partner with governments in circumstances that enable them to exploit vulnerabilities in our public institutions. Some of these vulnerabilities include increasing reliance by governments on private finance, and the short period between elections compared to the time it takes to deliver bold public works programs.
Lock-in happens when the real decision to build a project is made well in advance of processes that are publicly declared to inform that decision. Once governments are locked in to a project, it can make alternatives appear increasingly unviable, if not unthinkable.
There is strong evidence to suggest this happened with the West Gate Tunnel. <a href="https://www.theage.com.au/national/victoria/melbourne-an-international-pariah-on-west-gate-tunnel-experts-warn-20171207-h00use" target="_blank">Significant concerns</a> were raised early on that the project might not provide its claimed public benefits.
What makes market-led proposals different?
Market-led proposals differ from government-led projects because planning is effectively outsourced to the private sector.
Market-led proposals also differ from <a href="https://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/public-private-partnerships.asp" target="_blank">public-private partnerships</a>, like Melbourne’s CityLink tollway. In such cases, government plans these projects, but private firms deliver and operate them. (At least CityLink was part of a <a href="https://theconversation.com/50-years-on-from-the-melbourne-transportation-plan-what-can-we-learn-from-its-legacy-127721" target="_blank">long-standing, if largely discredited, strategic plan</a>.)
Revelations that Transurban acted in <a href="https://www.theage.com.au/politics/victoria/tunnel-trouble-dan-andrews-and-transurban-face-a-parting-of-the-ways-20200131-p53wjo" target="_blank">secretive and strategic ways</a> to secure support for its West Gate Tunnel raise serious ethical questions. What does it mean to be a “good partner” to government? How should powerful private corporations obtain a “social licence” to operate?
These questions draw attention to problems inherent in Victoria’s opaque market-led proposal process. The government’s caution about the AirRail consortium’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/market-led-infrastructure-may-sound-good-but-not-if-it-short-changes-the-public-127603" target="_blank">unsolicited bid for Melbourne’s airport rail link</a> points toward some of these dangers.
What’s wrong with this approach?
Government policies for assessing market-led proposals give <a href="https://www.theage.com.au/national/victoria/transurban-the-making-of-a-monster-20160512-gotjm9" target="_blank">powerful private firms like Transurban</a> influence over strategic planning. This contrasts with the relatively limited influence granted to affected communities and stakeholder groups advocating for sustainable transport solutions.
Acceptance of Transurban’s bid allowed a multi-billion-dollar toll road to override plans that had been <a href="https://www.viclabor.com.au/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Victorian-Labor-Platform-2014.pdf" target="_blank">taken to an election</a>. These plans were simpler and far less expensive. The plans had been developed with the local community to better manage freight traffic by <a href="https://www.viclabor.com.au/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Victorian-Labor-Platform-2014.pdf" target="_blank">upgrading access to existing freeways</a>.
The West Gate Tunnel process involved expedited planning that bypassed broad-based community consultation. John Holland and CPB Contractors were selected in April 2017 “<a href="https://www.premier.vic.gov.au/only-the-best-for-the-west-with-6000-new-jobs/" target="_blank">to get to work</a>” on the project. That was five months before <a href="http://westgatetunnelproject.vic.gov.au/library/environment-effects-statement" target="_blank">public hearings</a> concluded in September. Over 500 submissions were received.
Add to this the suppression of <a href="https://www.theage.com.au/national/victoria/expert-cut-from-toll-road-project-after-warning-tim-pallas-it-did-not-stack-up-20170803-gxoohi" target="_blank">independent and critical oversight</a> and a <a href="https://www.theage.com.au/politics/victoria/voters-need-to-see-light-at-start-of-west-gate-tunnel-20180219-h0wawa" target="_blank">heavily redacted</a> business case, and a very concerning picture of Victoria’s market-led process emerges. 
Wanted: an integrated transport plan
Because governments are ultimately responsible for their partnerships, the Victorian government should demonstrate stronger accountability and leadership. Victorians are still waiting for an integrated transport plan, as is required to be prepared under the <a href="https://transport.vic.gov.au/about/legislation" target="_blank">2010 Transport Integration Act</a>. Instead of outsourcing transport problems to private firms, the government should develop a statewide, genuinely consultative, evidence-based plan.
An integrated transport plan would allow Victorians to see how future mega-projects, regardless of who proposes them, might serve everyone’s interests.<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/131210/count.gif?distributor=republish-lightbox-basic" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" style="border: none !important; box-shadow: none !important; margin: 0 !important; max-height: 1px !important; max-width: 1px !important; min-height: 1px !important; min-width: 1px !important; opacity: 0 !important; outline: none !important; padding: 0 !important; text-shadow: none !important;">
<a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/james-whitten-954981" target="_blank">James Whitten</a>, Ph.D Candidate, Faculty of Architecture, Building and Planning, <a href="https://theconversation.com/institutions/university-of-melbourne-722" target="_blank">University of Melbourne</a>; <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/crystal-legacy-18412" target="_blank">Crystal Legacy</a>, Senior Lecturer in Urban Planning, <a href="https://theconversation.com/institutions/university-of-melbourne-722" target="_blank">University of Melbourne</a>, and <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/ian-woodcock-150260" target="_blank">Ian Woodcock</a>, Senior Lecturer, Director of Urban Design, <a href="https://theconversation.com/institutions/swinburne-university-of-technology-767" target="_blank">Swinburne University of Technology</a>
This article is republished from <a href="http://theconversation.com" target="_blank">The Conversation</a> under a Creative Commons license. Read the <a href="https://theconversation.com/west-gate-tunnel-saga-shows-risk-of-lock-in-on-mega-projects-pitched-by-business-131210" target="_blank">original article</a>.
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j.ballantyne1990-6AQqhLzZaK

Gate Tunnel saga shows risk of ‘lock-in’ on mega-projects pitched by business

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<img src="https://counter.theconversation.edu.au/content/79331/count.gif?distributor=republish-lightbox-advanced" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1">
GUEST OBSERVER
The recently released environmental effects statement and transportation impact assessment for the proposed West Gate Tunnel project in Melbourne’s western and inner suburbs have once again sparked debate about the future of mobility in Australian cities, and the ability of large road projects to provide it.
In the environmental effects statement, the assumptions behind the models on the need for the tunnel might paint a gloomier picture of the future than is warranted. Many are not inevitable and are, in fact, within the control of the state government and Melburnians.
Why we should be wary of the forecasts
The figures in the transport impact assessment are calculated using a traditional four-step model. 
Given the purpose to which the model has been put in this case, it is unsurprising that it predicts traffic chaos across metropolitan Melbourne in 2031. Also unsurprisingly, the modelling indicates that the West Gate Tunnel would ease this chaos. 
Comparing the “build” and “no-build” scenarios, both set in 2031, 28,000 fewer vehicles per day would use the congested West Gate Bridge if the tunnel is built. As it is designed to, the modelling presents a clear argument to build the tunnel.
There are numerous reasons to be suspicious of the modelled outcomes. For one, these models are notoriously unreliable. 
Research shows that half of road project forecasts are incorrect by more than plus or minus 20% after one year of operation. And for toll roads like the proposed West Gate Tunnel, the average observed error is 23% fewer vehicles using the road than forecast. 
Second, the extra 28,000 vehicles on the West Gate Bridge in the no-build case are not real cars; they are artefacts of the transport network assumptions. These assumptions feed into the models to create the build and no-build scenarios. 
The models predict a 48% increase in road traffic in 2031 and a 100% increase in public transport traffic. The transport impact assessment is relatively silent on the implications of this assumption about public transport patronage.
Cases built on pessimism bias
Studies indicate this 48% increase might be subject to “pessimism bias” – that is, a tendency to imagine the worst. A 2015 analysis found that in 70% of 35 transportation projects in Denmark and England actual travel demand did not reach the end-of-period forecast levels when the projects were not constructed.
Pessimism bias is a product of how the models understand historical road construction and traffic growth. It is likely present in the West Gate Tunnel proposal – but this cannot be measured as yet. 
The 2031 build and no-build cases both incorporate an extensive program of road network construction and expansion apart from the tunnel, which is standard practice. This includes 100 kilometres of additional motorway lanes in the CityLink and Western Ring Road widening projects. Both roads feed into the tunnel. 
VicRoads’ outer suburban arterial roads program includes an additional 700km of arterial roads, which feed into Melbourne’s greater road network. If these roads are not all built then the forecast will be incorrect.
Also, the annual traffic growth rates used in the models are primarily based on historical observation. From 1996 to 2016, traffic volumes across Melbourne grew by 2.6% annually. The model assumes this growth will continue. 
This period of growth includes the construction of the EastLink and Peninsula Link toll roads and several outer suburban arterial roads. Because the construction of roads promotes new traffic, these programs partly explain the growth from 1996 to 2016. 
Consider the alternatives
The “need” for the tunnel exists only because of the presence of extra road and motorway capacity in the modelling assumptions – and because of the absence of any estimates of the effect on car travel of improved public transport passenger and freight transport alternatives in Melbourne’s rapidly expanding western suburbs.
The package of roads that will generate traffic growth on the West Gate Bridge and in the proposed tunnel have not yet been built, and there is nothing inevitable about any of it. Melbourne’s East-West Link and Perth’s Roe 8 both demonstrate that public resistance is not necessarily futile. 
The government and Melburnians have a choice about how we build our cities. We can perpetuate the “need” for roads by continuing to build banal infrastructure, such as large suburban arterials or excessive car parking. This would create the conditions for roads like the West Gate Tunnel – or we could insist on something better.
<a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/nathan-pittman-382813" target="_blank">Nathan Pittman</a> is PhD Candidate in Transportation Planning, University of Melbourne.
<a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/john-stone-226753" target="_blank">John Stone</a> is Senior Lecturer in Transport Planning, University of Melbourne.
<a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/sophie-sturup-383657" target="_blank">Sophie Sturup</a> is Lecturer in Urban Planning and Design, Xi'an Jiaotong Liverpool University.
All are authors for <a href="https://theconversation.com/au" target="_blank">The Conversation</a>.
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