Australian economy vulnerable due to relatively high levels of household debt: Shane Oliver

Shane OliverDecember 8, 2020

Since the GFC excessive debt has been a source of volatility and constraint for various countries, notably the US and Europe. Initially the focus was on the private sector, more recently the public sector. Australia has relatively low public debt, but how does it stack up in terms of total debt? This is particularly relevant in assessing the vulnerability of Australia should something go wrong, e.g. if China collapses and our trends of trade plummeted.

Total debt outstanding

The next table shows total debt outstanding, i.e. public and private, as a percentage of GDP. Quite clearly Australia ranks a fair way down the list. As is well known, Australia’s level of public debt is very low. Where Australia is a bit more vulnerable is in terms of private debt, and this is largely due to a relatively high level of household debt.

Household debt in Australia rose strongly over the 20 years prior to the GFC as interest rates trended down, financial competition led to increased access to debt and relatively stable economic conditions and rising asset prices encouraged households to gear up.

Debt outstanding, % GDP

2012 data

Public

Private

Total

Netherlands

68

680

748

Japan

237

392

629

Denmark

47

551

598

UK

89

460

549

Belgium

99

390

489

France

90

396

486

Spain

91

390

481

Sweden

37

420

457

Euro zone

94

361

455

Portugal

119

294

413

Norway

50

341

391

Korea

34

354

388

Italy

126

258

384

US

100

240

340

Australia

30

291

321

Hungary

74

241

315

Germany

83

225

308

Canada

88

190

278

Greece

171

103

274

Source: IMF, Haver Analytics, Ned Davis Research, AMP Capital

The GFC has brought a more cautious attitude to debt on the part of Australians thanks to weaker asset prices, worries that house prices might go the same way as those in the US and parts of Europe and increased job insecurity, and this has been accentuated by a tightening in lending standards. Nevertheless, debt levels have basically stabilised relative to income in contrast to other countries where they have fallen, although this in large part reflects defaults in the US. See the previous chart. What’s more, with soft share markets and house prices and rising incomes in recent years, Australian household balance sheets as measured by net wealth (assets less liabilities) relative to income have deteriorated.

Source: OECD, RBA, AMP Capital

Similarly, soft asset prices at a time of stable debt levels have seen gearing, as measured by debt to assets, rise.

Source: OECD, RBA, AMP Capital

Against this several things are worth noting. First, reflecting household caution the household saving rate is now very high in Australia at around 10%, compared with just 3 to 4% in the US. This has been mainly flowing into bank deposits.

Source: OECD, AMP Capital

 


 

Finally, the riskiness of Australian housing loans has been falling. Non-performing loans remain low. Low-doc loans are only around 5% of outstanding housing loans and less than 2% of new approvals. And around 50% of home borrowers are ahead on repayments. And all mortgages are full recourse, meaning Australians cannot simply walk away from their homes if they have negative equity. And there is plenty of scope for the RBA to cut interest rates further.

Foreign liabilities

One area where Australia clearly is more vulnerable is in foreign debt. Thanks to a chronic current account deficit ranging between 2% and 6% of GDP – even through the mining boom – Australia has remained reliant on foreign capital. As a result net foreign liabilities, which includes debt and equity and is labelled net international investment position in the next chart, is relatively high at 60% of GDP.

Source: IMF, ABS, AMP Capital

Quite clearly Australia would be vulnerable should foreign investors change their view of investing in Australia. Mind you, this has been a risk since the 1980s!

What’s the risk?

While Australia’s debt levels are not causing problems now, this is not to say they are not without risk. For example, just before the GFC Ireland’s public debt to GDP ratio was the same as Australia’s is now, but this changed when house prices collapsed and banks had to be recapitalised.

The main risk is that something happens that severely affects the ability of households to service their mortgages and results in foreign investors changing their attitudes towards investing in Australia. Obviously, the RBA is unlikely to trigger the former by raising interest rates too far as it seems very sensitive to household fragility.

The prime risk is that China has a hard landing causing a slump in Australia’s export earnings, a sharp rise in unemployment, defaults, bank problems necessitating recapitalisation by the Government and a loss of confidence on the part of foreign investors.[1]

However, while this is clearly a risk several factors are worth noting: Firstly, the tolerance for a hard landing in China is very low in view of the social unrest it would trigger, and in any case recent Chinese economic indicators suggest that growth there may be bottoming around 7.5%.

Secondly, while house prices remain overvalued, the risk of a house price collapse remains low given undersupply, low loan to valuation ratios and full recourse loans in Australia.

Thirdly, if the economic environment for Australia sours significantly there is still plenty of scope for the RBA to cut interest rates. In fact 325 basis points worth, which would translate roughly into a fall in the standard variable mortgage rate to 4% if the banks’ continue to pass though 80% of RBA cuts. This would translate to an annual interest bill saving of around $6500 for someone with a $300,000 mortgage.

Fourthly, unlike the situation in countries like Japan or peripheral countries in Europe, Australia’s currency acts as a countercyclical buffer and would likely collapse if there were a big collapse in Australia’s export prices (they haven’t really fallen so much so far, so the fact that the $A is around $US1.04 is not surprising). This could cause the $A to easily fall back towards $US0.60 delivering a massive boost to industries such as manufacturing, tourism and higher education that have struggled through the mining boom.

Finally, pent-up demand exists in big parts of the Australian economy, in part due to measures to make way for the mining boom. Housing construction and retailing have been running well below capacity. This can be unleashed as mining slows and lower interest rates, and possibly a lower $A would be part of the mechanism to achieve this.

Concluding comments

Australia is not without its risks on the debt front and to be safe needs to continue to head back towards a budget surplus (to cap public debt) and for households to continue to run relatively high savings in order to boost their net wealth and cap household debt. However, the probability of a major debt crisis occurring is likely low as China is unlikely to have a hard landing, there is still plenty of scope to cut interest rates and the Australian dollar is likely to fulfil its role as a shock absorber in the event of a big loss to national income.



[1] See “Australia – the going gets tough for the lucky country,” Oliver’s Insights, September 2012, which discussed this scenario.

Dr Shane Oliver is head of investment strategy and chief economist at AMP Capital

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